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Introduction
Over the span of three days in October 
of 2008, the three largest Icelandic banks–
Kaupthing, Landsbanki, and Glitner–collapsed.
The assets these three banks held constituted
about 85% of the entire banking system, esti-
mated at ten times Iceland’s gross domestic
product. The Icelandic people have largely
attributed the collapse to the actions of the
overzealous and inexperienced Icelandic
bankers. In 2003, Richard Thomas, a Merrill
Lynch credit analyst, described the risk-seeking
behavior of Icelandic bankers as “too fast, too
young, too much, too short, too connected,
too volatile.” (Jónsson, p. 123) But through-
out the boom and eventual bust, much of the
Icelandic financial sector was unrestrained
and poorly regulated by its central financial
authority. This article investigates the failures
of those institutions that were responsible for
maintaining the integrity of Iceland’s financial
system. It also examines the reasons for those
failures and the steps taken to mediate and
correct them. The main question addressed is
whether the current reform is adequate to
prevent another collapse or if further changes
are required to ensure the future security of the
Icelandic financial market.
The Need to Rebuild
With such a catastrophic collapse, Ice-
landers might be hesitant to rebuild a privatized
financial sector, the mishandling of which
devastated their economy. However, the Ice-
landic economy is dependent on a functioning
international banking sector and, therefore, can-
not shut itself off from the global financial mar-
ketplace for fear of another crisis. An interna-
tional banking sector is necessary for the growth
of the Icelandic economy because many of its
key companies, in the aluminum smelting
and fishing industries, for example, are global
companies dealing in international contracts.
These companies are largely exporters; thus,
international banks are necessary to facilitate
foreign exchange transactions. (Skulason) In
addition, as domestic businesses recover from
this shock to the economy, a reformed commer-
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cial banking sector will facilitate lending and
business formation. Moreover, although the cur-
rent generation of Icelanders may be weary of
an international financial sector, the lure of
cheap credit and higher returns may convince
the next generation of bankers to open up Ice-
land’s doors once more. Because of these pos-
sibilities, a far-reaching financial reform must
alter not only existing legislation but also the
Icelandic philosophy toward financial regula-
tion. Reform must instill in Iceland a risk
management culture that was absent in the
years preceding the collapse and move the
Icelandic people from an inclination toward
deregulation to an affinity for more supervision.
Icelandic Regulatory Institutions 
The main institution responsible for
financial regulation in Iceland is the Financial
Supervisory Authority (FME, its acronym in Ice-
landic). It was created in 1999 from a merger of
the Insurance Supervisory Authority and the
Banking Inspectorate of the Central Bank of Ice-
land (CBI). (Jännäri, p. 6) According to its
website, the FME has a mandate to promote a
stable financial services market, maintain a solid
foundation for the financial services market, and
promote credible and lawful operations. It is also
responsible for surveillance of the Depositors’
and Investors’ Guarantee Fund. (Financial
Supervisory Authority of Iceland)
Along with the FME, the CBI shares
responsibility in the regulation and promotion
of an efficient and secure financial system.
Although most of the past supervisory activities
of the CBI were passed to the newly formed FME
in 1999, a financial stability function was estab-
lished at the CBI, later becoming a full depart-
ment in 2001. (Jännäri, p. 5) This Financial Sta-
bility Department is responsible for the liquidity
and credit rules of financial institutions and
overseeing compliance with these rules as
well as systemic oversight of the payment and
settlements system. It is also responsible for the
publication of the Financial Stability Report, a
yearly report on the “main vulnerabilities and
resilience factors” (Central Bank of Iceland, Vol.
5, pp. 5-6) in the current macroeconomic sit-
uation. In October 2006, a cooperation agree-
ment between the FME and CBI was established
to facilitate cooperative regulation between
the two authorities. (Jännäri, p. 9)
Several ministries also have a hand in
financial regulation. The Prime Minister’s office
is responsible for legislation pertaining to the
CBI, and the Ministry for Business Affairs is
responsible for all other financial legislation,
including legislation for the FME and finan-
cial undertakings such as the banks and deposit
guarantee system. The Ministry of Finance
has a central role in the budget and macro-
economic policies and is responsible for enforc-
ing legislation pertaining to accounting and
pension funds. After the crisis, the Ministry of
Finance effectively became the owner of the
failed banks. In February 2006, a Consultative
Group consisting of representatives from the
Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Business
Affairs, the FME, and the CBI was established
through a Memorandum of Understanding to
facilitate cooperation between these ministries
in the area of financial stability. Although not
a decision-making body, it was used as a forum
for the exchange of information between the
many regulatory authorities and to discuss
the need for management of a possible crisis.
(Jännäri, p. 9) The Ministry of Economic Affairs
was created after the crisis and oversees both
the FME and the CBI. 
Liberalization of Icelandic Financial 
Institutions
In the late 1990s, there was a global
movement to liberalize financial markets and
capital movements. When it became a mem-
ber of the European Economic Area in 1993,
Iceland opened itself up to the European com-
mon market with the free flow of goods, labor,
services, and capital. European regulation
allowed Icelandic banks to operate branches
in any European Economic Area state.1 Ice-
landic banks were privatized in the early 2000s,
with ownership of the banks centralized to a
small number of well-connected individuals
instead of spread out over many foreign and
domestic investors. This was due to a politicized
landmark decision in 2002 that allowed the
investor group Samson to hold a de facto con-
trolling interest of 45% in Landsbanki, the
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1These states include all EU member states as well as
Liechtenstein and Norway.
largest Icelandic bank at the time. The case
stood as precedent when Kaupthing and Glitner
were created in a process of mergers, and the
FME was therefore unable to limit the con-
centration of ownership during the privatiza-
tion process. There was little interest by inter-
national banks in entering and competing in
Iceland’s financial market because of the coun-
try’s small volatile market and currency area.
One international bank that did attempt to enter
the Icelandic market was turned down, likely for
protectionist reasons. The end result was three
major Icelandic banks in the hands of a small
group of well-connected people, who, instead of
possessing the traditional commercial bank-
ing mindset, favored a strategy of risky and fast-
paced growth common to investment bankers.
(Jännäri, p. 9)
After the final steps of privatization took
place in 2003, the largest banks went on lever-
aged buyout sprees across ¬Scandinavia and
Britain, financing their risky endeavors through
debt accumulation. The stage was set for expo-
nential growth in the financial sector, as yield-
hungry investors looked to the small country
for high returns. As illustrated in Figure 1,
Kaupthing, Landsbanki, and Glitner grew their
assets by 20-fold in seven years, supported by
favorable credit ratings from international rat-
ing agencies. But although the private sector
grew rapidly, Iceland did not see an equal
increase in a supervisory presence. In the years
preceding the collapse, the booming financial
market was patrolled by an inadequate super-
visory system.
Failure of Institutions
The causes of the financial crisis and the
failures of the regulatory framework have been
assessed by two major reports. The first report,
published in March 2009, was conducted by the
former Director of the Finnish Financial Super-
visory Authority, Kaarlo Jännäri, as part of the
Stand-By arrangement with the International
Monetary Fund and several other Nordic coun-
tries. The second inquiry, published in April
2010, was conducted by the Special Investiga-
tion Commission (SIC) created by the Icelandic
Parliament to investigate and analyze what led
to the collapse of the three banks. Given the cen-
tral role played by Icelandic institutions before
and during the financial crisis, this article exam-
ines some of the inadequacies of these institu-
tions. 
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Source: Financial Stability Report 2009.
Financial Supervisory Authority
A supervisory authority for an international
banking system should have knowledge of
finance, economics, the operations of banks, and
national and international banking legislation.
Because Iceland is a small nation, the supervi-
sory authorities had been strained in their
efforts to find and retain employees with all of
the appropriate qualifications. (Peterson) The
rapid expansion of the banks, particularly from
2004 to 2006, intensified this deficiency. The
brightest graduates and young professionals,
regardless of subject area of study or experience,
jumped at the chance to become bankers. Rag-
nar Arnason, a professor at the University of Ice-
land who teaches fishing economics, com-
mented on this tendency: “Everyone was
learning Black-Scholes" (referring to the
options-pricing model); "The schools of engi-
neering and math were offering courses on
financial engineering. We had hundreds and
hundreds of people studying finance." (Lewis)
Because salaries paid to FME employees were
not competitive with those in the private bank-
ing sector (Jännäri, p. 7), these graduates were
lured to the private banks while their regulators
struggled to attract young talent. Those who
chose to work in a supervisory role were often
offered much higher salaries after a few years to
switch to work in the private sector. This train-
ing camp for bankers created a high influx
and outflow of employees. (Óddsson) 
The SIC report found that based on the
operating expenses of the FME and its budget,
the supervisory authority was not financially
equipped to monitor the banks, given the pace
of growth. The FME also lacked the technical
expertise and IT systems to process and evalu-
ate the vast amount of financial data needed
in continuous financial monitoring. (Report
of the Special..., p. 100) These shortcomings
greatly hampered its ability to monitor finan-
cial institutions in the years preceding the
collapse, which in turn allowed banks to expand
in an unsustainable way. Although statutory
minimum capital requirements were never
breached, the capital ratios that regulators were
monitoring did not reflect the true strength of
the banks. This was due to the common prac-
tice of weak equity, whereby banks secured loans
with collateral in their own shares as well as
shares of the other Icelandic banks. This cross-
financing and weak equity amounted to 70%
of the core component of the capital base–about
400 billion Icelandic krónur (or about $7 billion
at the height of the króna in 2007). (Baldurs-
son) This overstatement of equity allowed the
banks to grow at a more rapid pace. And
although the FME had the power to increase
required equity, it failed to do so. 
It is also apparent that in times of legally
questionable activity, the FME neglected to
assert its legal dominance over these institu-
tions. Such was the case in the FME’s han-
dling of related party lending and large expo-
sures. Post-collapse SIC examinations of each
of the three banks revealed that the principal
owners were among the largest borrowers.
The report was critical of this tendency: 
When it so happens that the biggest
owners of a bank, who appoint members
to the board of that same bank and exert
for that reason strong influence within the
bank, are, at the same time, among the
bank’s biggest borrowers, questions arise
as to whether the lending is done on a
commercial basis or whether the borrower
possibly benefits from being an owner and
has easier access to more advantageous
loan facilities than others. (Report of the
Special..., p. 9)
The lack of an assertive supervisor was
particularly detrimental in a country as small as
Iceland, because personal ties between lenders
and borrowers made it difficult to have truly
arms-length transactions. (Skulason) The FME
was aware of this dangerous yet commonplace
scenario and suggested in 2007 that the banks
scale down the outstanding loans to these par-
ties. In general, the banks did not follow the
FME’s suggested changes. Instead, they rejected
the regulator’s interpretations and maintained
that the exposures were not related. By the time
the banks collapsed, the FME had failed to exer-
cise its powers to force changes in the banks’
credit risk profiles. In addition, because of bank
privacy rules, the FME did not inform the CBI
of these known exposures, which were only
brought to light during the height of the cri-
20
sis in October 2008. (Report of the Special...,
p. 12) This failure shows that legislation is not
enough to ensure a successful regulatory sys-
tem. Although Iceland had rules on these large
exposures in accordance with European Union
objectives, their inability (or perhaps unwilling-
ness) to enforce discretion over the banks
negated much of the legal framework. 
Central Bank of Iceland
The CBI must also share responsibility for
the collapse due to its inability to maintain price
stability through monetary policy. The influx of
foreign capital into the hands of Icelandic
bankers caused the economy to over-expand
after bank privatization in 2003. It was the
responsibility of the CBI to cool the overheat-
ing economy. The SIC found that the bank
was slow in its decisions to lift rates, and the
eventual increase in rates beginning in the
spring of 2004 prompted foreign investors to
take advantage of the higher returns. The influx
of capital only accelerated the boom in domes-
tic consumption. (Peterson) Because it was a
small currency area, the attempts of the CBI
at contractionary monetary policy had an expan-
sionary effect, so the CBI’s actions further stim-
ulated the expanding balance sheets of the
banks.
With the uncertainty regarding the effect
of interest rate adjustments as a policy tool, the
CBI could have also responded by raising reserve
requirements, as it is legally responsible for liq-
uidity risk supervision and regulates the mini-
mum liquid assets held by the banks. This was
not attempted. The lack of action could possi-
bly have stemmed from the inadequate liquid-
ity stress tests conducted by the CBI and FME.
Although some stress tests were conducted on
the banks’ liquidity, the worst scenario tested
was if one of the banks would run into diffi-
culties. They did not consider the possibility that
all three banks could simultaneously face a col-
lapse. Although the scenarios tested were in line
with international best practices, the CBI could
have required more stringent tests consider-
ing the large amount of foreign assets of the Ice-
landic banking system and the interconnect-
edness of the banks. These tests were also
weakened because they were conducted off-
site with figures supplied by the banks, because
the CBI did not have an explicit legal right to
conduct tests on-site to verify the validity of
those figures. Instead, internal auditors per-
formed annual checks to ensure reliable report-
ing by the banks and submitted results to the
CBI. Internal audit reports cited few deficien-
cies, yet in retrospect it is apparent that in some
cases the banks reported overstated and mis-
leading figures. If the CBI had the right to
conduct tests on-site, instead of relying on
second-hand reports from internal auditors,
some instances of fraudulent reporting may
have been avoided. (Jännäri, pp. 24-25) 
Given the large amount of foreign debt held
by the banks, the CBI was in no position to sup-
ply the needed liquidity as a lender of last resort
and was therefore unable to guarantee a stable
banking system. The CBI neglected to build
up foreign exchange reserves to adequately
cover the international risks increasingly taken
on by the banks. Foreign currency deposits grew
to eight times the CBI’s foreign currency
reserves. (Report of the Special..., p. 5) The
CBI only held 20% of the total short-term for-
eign liabilities in gross foreign reserves. By
2007, that number had dropped to 7%, as for-
eign currencies made up more than 70% of
the three largest banks’ balance sheets. (Jännäri,
p. 15) This, in conjunction with an underfunded
Depositors’ and Investors’ Guarantee Fund, only
exacerbated the run on Icelandic banks once
international credit lines dried up. After the
crash, the CBI faced bankruptcy and was recap-
italized at the expense of taxpayers.
Parliament
According to findings of the SIC, supervi-
sory actions to prevent the collapse of the
expanding financial sector were required no
later than 2006 if Iceland was to avoid a severe
impact on the value of its assets. However,
national pride in the banking sector, with con-
tinued support from many politicians, may have
made this sort of restriction by the FME or
CBI difficult to implement. Critics believe that
the close ties between the banks and the polit-
ical parties that enabled their privatization “pro-
grammed virtually the entire political class and
civil service to think that is was not a good
idea to get in the way of the banks.” (Gylfason,
p. 148) According to the coalition agreement
21
between the Independence Party and Social
Democratic Alliance, it was their policy to
“ensure that financial activities could con-
tinue to grow domestically and expand into new
fields of competition with other market areas.”
(Report of the Special..., p. 2) The government
also encouraged domestic multinational corpo-
rations to have their headquarters remain in Ice-
land, although it was known that the small gov-
ernment could not support a failed financial
sector. In February 2006, a working group estab-
lished in 2004 by Parliament delivered a report
on the uneasy status of the financial markets,
highlighting the size of the financial sector and
the need for contingency planning for a crisis
situation. The suggested amendments to the
supervisory power were never formally sub-
mitted to Parliament as a bill, and there was
only a short discussion of the report by Parlia-
ment. It seemed that the legislative branch
did not believe tighter control over the financial
sector was a priority until it was too late. The
proposal was later taken up again and used as
a basis for the emergency legislation in October
2008. (Jännäri, p. 15)
Shared Responsibility
There was confusion between the regula-
tory authorities and other government units
over which entity was ultimately responsible for
emergency actions during times of crisis. Dur-
ing the weeks leading up to the crash, there was
a large amount of uncertainty about the powers
and responsibilities of several of the supervisory
institutions. The Consultative Group, consist-
ing of the Prime Minister’s Office, the Min-
istry of Finance, the Ministry of Business Affairs,
the FME, and the CBI, had been established in
February 2006 through a Memorandum of
Understanding. (Jännäri, p. 9) Although it was
not established for the express purpose of cre-
ating contingency plans and had no legal
authority over any part of the government,
the Consultative Group largely took on that role
during the crisis. However, there seemed to be
a lack of clarity as to who was responsible for
the preparations called for in the Group’s plan
of action. The Group was unsuccessful in syn-
chronizing actions that could fall under several
governmental bodies, as in the case of the
Landsbanki’s international branch accounts,
known as Icesave. The Icesave accounts were
Internet saving accounts offered abroad to
British and Norwegian depositors. There were
several governmental institutions that may have
had jurisdiction over the international branches,
such as the FME, CBI, Ministry of Finance,
and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However,
because jurisdiction was unclear, no govern-
mental institution stepped forward to request
that Landsbanki transfer its accounts to a sub-
sidiary. Transferring these accounts to a sub-
sidiary outside of Iceland would have released
Iceland’s government from being responsible for
insuring those deposits if the bank were to
default. When the bank failed, Iceland found
itself responsible for not only domestic deposits
but also more than 400,000 deposits in the
United Kingdom and the Netherlands. State-
ments made to the SIC by ministers and gov-
ernmental representatives after the crisis
included much finger pointing, with few assum-
ing responsibility for the lack of action. (Report
of the Special..., p. 73)
Post-crisis Regulatory Reform
There have been several steps taken by
the Icelandic government to make far-reach-
ing systemic reforms, prompted by the con-
clusions of the two major investigative reports.
Kaarlo Jännäri’s report largely pointed to the
deficiencies in the legal framework. His sug-
gested changes included decreasing the num-
ber of ministries, merging the CBI and FME,
granting more discretionary powers to the FME,
creating a national credit registry, applying
stricter rules on large exposures and lending
to the banks’ own large shareholders, con-
ducting more on-site inspections to verify off-
site supervision, and improving the deposit
guarantee system. (Central Bank of Iceland, Vol.
5, p. 12) The SIC report had similar conclusions,
arguing that the failure was largely due to reck-
less bank actions that were unobstructed by leg-
islation. However, the report did identify three
former ministers, three former CBI governors,
and the director of the FME as having shown
negligence in their duties. More importantly,
the report pointed to the dangerous tendency of
supervisory institutions to interpret regula-
tory options narrowly, thereby allowing banks
to bypass regulation with ease. The Commission
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criticized the regulatory agencies for not mak-
ing more efforts to investigate the underlying
risk of the banking system and for failing to have
a governmental contingency plan in place dur-
ing the collapse. These findings have prompted
many of the reforms, discussed in this article,
which are currently under way in Iceland.
Act on Financial Undertakings
In response to the Jännäri report, the
Ministry of Economic Affairs was established
as the administrator responsible for both the
FME and CBI, intended to enhance macropru-
dential supervision. Macroprudential supervi-
sion, as the CBI explained in the foreword to the
2010 Stability Report, is a concept promoting
the use of “prudential tools to reduce risk in the
financial system as a whole rather than in
individual parts of it.” (Central Bank of Iceland,
Vol. 6, p. 4) Such risks include those resulting
from systemically important individual finan-
cial institutions and credit and asset price cycles.
A committee was appointed by the head of the
newly created Ministry to review the legisla-
tive framework and draft more stringent legis-
lation. The new bill on the financial market was
proposed to the Icelandic Parliament on Janu-
ary 29, 2010. 
Several reforms were incorporated in this
bill that expanded the range of supervisory activ-
ities and intended to improve risk management
and bank governance. (Ministry for Foreign
Affairs) The FME was given increased discre-
tionary powers, such as tightening credit limits
for financial institutions and eligibility stan-
dards for potential investors. The bill also estab-
lished a national credit registry containing data
on all loans granted above a certain amount. The
registry would store this information to moni-
tor banks’ credit risk and households’ and firms’
debt levels, allowing regulators an aggregate
view to better monitor systemic risk. (Central
Bank of Iceland, Vol. 5, p. 88)
The bill also addressed many of the prob-
lematic practices that banks conducted in the
years preceding the crisis, clarifying the rules
that were already in place and proposing new
restrictions. The bill covered such actions as
lending against collateral of the bank’s own
shares and the shares of other banks, lending to
key personnel within the bank, and taking on
large exposures. It also increased the provisions
covering internal and external bank auditing.
Members of the board of directors of financial
institutions were given greater responsibility
and accountability, and tighter rules on remu-
neration, bonus systems, and severance agree-
ments were established. In addition to this Act
on Financial Undertakings, three other bills
were presented to Parliament by May 2010 con-
cerning Deposit Insurance, Investment Funds,
and Insurance Activities.
Central Bank Act
An amendment to the Central Bank Act
was passed in February 2009 that changed the
CBI's governance structure from a three-mem-
ber Board of Governors to a two-member Board
consisting of one Governor and one Deputy Gov-
ernor, both appointed by the Prime Minister.
The amendment also established professional
requirements for both positions. A Monetary
Policy Committee was established as a deci-
sion–making body for domestic interest rate
policies and exchange rate policies. The Com-
mittee is composed of the Governor and Deputy
Governor, one senior CBI official, and two
outside experts. (Central Bank of Iceland, Vol.
6, p. 58) These changes were spurred by a
political controversy surrounding the head of
the CBI from 2005 to 2009, David Oddsson, who
also served as Prime Minister from 1991 to 2004.
Johanna Sigurdardottir, who became Prime
Minister in February 2009, had made it a pri-
ority to remove the central bankers when she
came to power, believing they were largely to
blame for allowing the buildup of untenable
debt. Mr. Oddsson refused to leave the CBI after
Mrs. Sigurdardottir’s call for his resignation, so
the Central Bank Act was passed by Parlia-
ment to forcibly remove him from his office.
(Gilmore)
Promoting Intergovernmental 
Cooperation
Attempts have been made to improve the
relationship between the CBI, the FME, and rel-
evant ministries, as a closer collaboration
between these institutions could help prevent
some of the past deficiencies in the regulatory
framework from arising in the future. In Sep-
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tember 2010, the Committee on Financial Sta-
bility was established by an agreement signed
by the Prime Minister, Minister of Finance, Min-
ister of Economic Affairs, Governor of the
Central Bank, and Director of the Financial
Services Authority.  The aims of the Committee
are stated as follows:
The committee on financial stability shall
enhance cooperation, facilitate the
exchange of information and increase
preparedness to maintain financial
stability and coordinate crisis prevention
efforts. The committee also induces more
transparency regarding the institutions
individual and shared responsibilities
and areas for cooperation. (Central Bank
of Iceland, August 2010)
Although not a decision-making body, the Com-
mittee will hopefully increase cooperation
within the government, facilitating policy mak-
ing during times of financial trouble. 
The CBI and FME have also made attempts
to consolidate their monitoring policies in a
joint task force, created in Feburary 2008. The
task force is intended to improve monitoring
group market liquidity. (Jännäri, p. 23) Már
Guðmundsson, Governor of the CBI since
August 2009, reiterated the need for this type of
cooperation in his foreword to the 2009 Report
on Financial Stability. He argued that for the
CBI to fulfill its duty as lender of last resort
and maintain financial stability, it must have
access to information about distressed financial
institutions, large exposures to the system,
and other information possessed by financial
supervisors. Because exchange rate movements
can greatly affect domestic financial institutions
and knowledgable personnel are limited in such
a small country, the need for enhanced coop-
eration between the two entities is great. (Cen-
tral Bank of Iceland, Vol. 5, pp. 5-6)
Judicial Decisions
A common practice of banks during the
boom years was to offer loans linked to for-
eign currencies, such as the Japanese yen, allow-
ing borrowers to take advantage of low interna-
tional interest rates. However, beginning in
2008, the króna began declining in value and
had lost more than a third of its value against
these other currencies by the time of the banks’
collapse (see Figure 2). The repayment costs
to consumers for these loans became prohibi-
tively expensive. In June 2010, Iceland’s
Supreme Court ruled that car loans linked to
foreign currencies, worth 186 billion Icelandic
krónur, were illegal and later clarified that banks
should use domestic interest rates when cal-
culating charges. This ruling effectively passed
the liability from households to the banks.
(Ward) As the case stands as precedent, the deci-
sion strongly dissuades future banks from
attempting such high-risk tactics, because they
will be unable to transfer the risks to their
borrowers. 
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Source: Central Bank of Iceland.
Criminal Cases
On September 28, 2010, Parliament voted
to bring charges against former Prime Minister
Geir Haarde, following the suggestions of the
SIC report. He will be tried for committing “eco-
nomic negligence” during his tenure, from 2006
to 2009, because he allowed the financial indus-
try to expand beyond the control of the gov-
ernment. Next in the process, Parliament must
appoint a special prosecutor to bring the charges
in the first sitting of the Landsdomur, a cham-
ber created in 1905 to try ministers accused
by Parliament of crimes. Parliament voted
against trying three other ministers: Bjorgvin
Sigurdsson, the former Minister of Commerce;
Arni Mathiesen, the former Minister of Finance;
and Ingibjorg Solrun Gisladottir, the former
Minister of Foreign Affairs. (“Former Ice-
landic…”)
Moving Forward
Iceland is a small country with its own
currency and a large, internationally exposed
financial industry. Although greater supervision
may have lessened the severity of the collapse,
its economic model, which was dependent on
an oversized financial sector, was inherently
flawed. Iceland has made strong attempts to cor-
rect the errors in its regulatory system, which
will restrict future banks from growing to
such unsustainable levels. However, legal reform
alone may not be enough to prevent another cri-
sis. The supervisory system, in particular the
FME, failed to exercise power over the banks
even when it had the legal capacity. A correspon-
ding change in the society’s views on regulation
and supervision is needed to supplement the
current financial reform. The severe conse-
quences of the financial crisis, including a
deep recession, restrictions on currency
exchange, loss of real wealth, and a damaged
international reputation, have helped bring that
change to the Icelandic people. The ideology
of a loosely regulated free market, which allowed
a banking system to expand dangerously while
a weak supervisory framework lost control over
the banks, has been called into question. Prime
Minister Johanna Sigurdardottir expressed
this ideologic shift during the release of the SIC
report in April 2010.
Mistakes were certainly made. The private
banks failed, the supervisory system failed,
the politics failed, the administration
failed, the media failed, and the ideology
of an unregulated free market utterly
failed. This has called for a fundamental
review of many elements of our society.
(Prime Minister’s Office)
The regulatory system was unsuccessful because
it lacked the knowledge as well as the will to
enforce existing regulations. The supervisory
institutions, the banks, Parliament, and the Ice-
landic people all failed to push for stronger reg-
ulatory enforcement until the banks reached a
point of no return. Although the crisis severely
harmed Iceland, it instilled a healthy sense of
distrust that is at the core of financial supervi-
sion. The government and the public must
demand tighter regulation over the banks, not
allowing them to expand in an unrestrained
manner because of apparent short-term eco-
nomic benefits. The foundation of this legal
reform is now in place. What remains to be seen
is if Iceland keeps financial regulation a prior-
ity, maintaining and updating the legislation
as financial markets and instruments evolve.
Hopefully, the lessons from this crisis will entice
the Iceland government and voters to insist that
their government constantly regulate and
supervise financial institutions, allowing a newly
formed financial sector to prosper in a con-
trolled and sustainable fashion. 
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